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  11. Introduction 
Tradeable property rights systems are increasingly being considered by fisheries management as 
the most promising solution to the problems that often accompany open-access resource use.  
The potential efficiency gains from tradeable property rights over the more traditional command-
and-control style regulations, given all the strict assumptions are satisfied, are well documented 
in both the theoretical and empirical literature [Moloney and Pearse 1979; Weninger 1998; 
Grafton, Squires and Fox 2000; Weninger, Grafton, Kirkley and Squires 2003].  By introducing 
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) into a perfectly competitive fishery in which fishermen 
have complete information, can interact in the permit market with zero transactions costs, and 
where the initial distribution of quotas does not affect the marginal valuation of the resource, the 
fishery is expected to realize an efficient distribution of fishing effort.  
  In tandem with the predicted efficiency gains, recent research has emphasized that 
fishermen, in aggregate, may achieve welfare increases as a result of ITQ management 
[Terrebonne 1995; Matulich and Sever 1999; Heaps 2003; Boyce 2004].  However, these 
potential welfare gains depend critically on the assumption that all sectors of the fishing industry 
are perfectly competitive and that consumers’ demand is elastic.  Case studies of fisheries in 
which these assumptions do not accurately describe the industry are ubiquitous (for a review see 
National Research Council 1999). 
  A number of studies in the economics literature analyze how monopoly power in the 
harvesting sector (fishermen amassing large percentages of quotas) may alter the environmental 
and economic performance of ITQs [Anderson 1991; Adelaja, Menzo and McCay 1998].  In 
contrast, very few studies have analyzed the problem of introducing a property rights system in a 
fishery with a less than competitive processing sector.  In a related study, Matulich, 
  2Mittelhammer and Reberte (1996) explore the welfare losses to processors with nonmalleable 
capital investments under an ITQ regime.  Their research, however, does not extend the analysis 
to allow processors to exercise market power in the purchase of input and sale of output.  Love 
(1995) uses data from the Pacific halibut industry to test for the existence of market power in the 
processing sector.  He finds that the degree of monopsony power varies inversely with the length 
of the fishing season.  However, the study does not estimate how market power in the processing 
sector impacts the welfare levels of the fishery’s participants.    
  This paper contributes to the existing literature by developing a flexible model of 
imperfect competition for analyzing the long-run effects of ITQ management on fishermen’s 
welfare in the presence of an imperfectly competitive processing sector.  The analysis is 
developed in the context of the Atlantic herring fishery, but may be generalized to any fishery 
exhibiting similar industry structure.   
Predicting how policy-induced welfare measures change when relaxing the assumption of 
a perfectly competitive industry is critical for analyzing many fisheries as well as multi-tiered 
agricultural product markets in general [Sexton 2000; McCorriston 2002].  Related agricultural 
market studies show that the existence of oligopsony-oligopoly power in the processing of foods 
can affect the size and distribution of welfare changes from technological innovation [Chen and 
Lent 1992; Dryburgh and Doyle 1995; Huang and Sexton 1996; Alston, Sexton and Zhang 1997; 
Hamilton and Sunding 1997; Sexton and Zhang 1996].  In general, if regulators falsely assume 
that an industry is behaving perfectly competitive, the predicted consequences of prescribed 
policies are likely to be misleading.      
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a background on the 
management of Atlantic herring and the structure of the bait processing industry; in Section 3 we 
  3develop the general model; Section 4 presents the welfare analysis; Sections 5 and 6 provide a 
discussion of policy implications and some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Background on Atlantic herring  
2.1 Existing regulation and the need for further action 
The Atlantic herring fishery is on the verge of implementing property rights based management. 
Since January 2000, the Atlantic herring fishery has been managed under a federal fisheries 
management plan (FMP) developed jointly by the New England Fisheries Management Council 
(NEFMC) and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC).
i  The fishery is 
divided into four management areas (figure 1), and the primary management tool is a cap on 
aggregate harvest and harvests within each area (the total allowable catch, or TAC) [NEFMC 
1999].  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Given that existing regulations do not limit the number of participants allowed in the fishery nor 
do they limit individual effort levels, in practice the fishery remains open access.  Like other 
fisheries that restrict aggregate harvest levels without restricting effort levels, an unbounded 
number of fishermen race for an unspecified portion of the herring total allowable catch (TAC).  
This type of derby fishing promotes inefficiencies and potentially limits the length of the fishing 
season, which can disrupt herring supplies and jeopardize the overall stability of the fishing 
industry [Gordon 1954; NEFMC 2005].   
  In response to these concerns, the two management bodies (NEFMC and ASMFC) have 
developed the first amendment to the 2000 management plan.  The objectives of the amendment 
  4include to “prevent excess capacity in the harvesting sector” and to “minimize, to the extent 
practicable, the race to fish for Atlantic herring in all management areas” [NEFMC 2005].  To 
address these broad goals, there is a provision within the amendment to allow an ITQ system to 
be implemented in the future through a streamlined public review process.
ii    
  In aggregate, the statistics available on the status of the commercial herring fishery 
suggest little cause for immediate management action.  Total harvests during 2000 to 2004 have 
averaged roughly only 55% of the fishery-wide TAC.  In addition, scientific assessments indicate 
that the herring biomass as a whole has been increasing over recent years.
iii  However, when 
analyzing the fishery by individual management areas there are two major causes for concern.  
First, effort is not dispersed evenly throughout the four management areas of the fishery.  The 
inshore area 1A has rapidly exhausted 100% of its quota in four of the five years between 2000 
and 2004 (table 1).  The other inshore area, area 1B, has also witnessed high harvest levels 
relative to the two offshore management areas.  Fishermen and management continue to voice 
concern about the existing race to fish in management area 1A and how those resulting 
inefficiencies may become exacerbated with any increase in demand for herring.          
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The uncertainties surrounding an abrupt increase in the demand for herring motivate the second 
major concern.  Although currently the market supply and demand for herring have settled at a 
quantity below the TAC, there is evidence that this could change.  As the primary source of bait 
for American lobstermen, the health of the herring fishery, which allocates roughly 60% of its 
total harvest to lobster bait, is consequently very dependent on the state of the lobster industry.  
Lobsters have long remained the most lucrative commercial fishery on the eastern coast of the 
United States, earning annual revenues averaging over 300 million dollars in the past five years.  
  5Although lobster harvest rates have remained relatively stable over the same time frame, in 2004 
the fishery witnessed the largest annual catch since 1999 (roughly 40,000 metric tons), a 23% 
increase from 2003 [NOAA 2006].  In addition, developments in information and shipping 
technologies have enabled the fishery to meet demands outside of New England.  New shipping 
products like the “Habitat Packing Solution” allow live lobsters to be shipped virtually anywhere 
in the world at reasonable costs [East Coast Seafood Company 2006]. 
  The primary concern regarding a future swift increase in the demand for herring as 
lobster bait is that it could exacerbate the already inefficient race to the fish in areas 1A and 1B.  
The majority of herring sold as lobster bait is harvested from these inshore areas.  A positive 
shock in demand would likely create incentives that could potentially motivate additional 
participants to enter the industry, thus exacerbating problems associated with excess capacity.
iv  
Although a portion of the predicted increase in effort could take place in the offshore areas, the 
added costs of transport and refrigeration tied to harvesting bait in these areas would likely limit 
such a movement.  Thus, further regulatory action to alleviate the problems associated with 
derby-style fishing is imperative.  
 
2.2  ITQ management in the Atlantic herring fishery and the concern for market power 
Although an individual property rights system has been submitted under Amendment 1, not all 
stakeholders are supportive.  Processors voice concern about a drastic change in the flow of 
herring supply due to a change in the fishing season and its effect on their processing capacity.  
Herring fishermen as well hold a number of apprehensions. Herring fishermen disagree on how 
and to whom ITQs should be allocated, and many fear manipulation of the ITQs market by those 
  6with large holdings.  Herring fishermen may have yet another reason for remaining skeptical 
concerning ITQ management and it is this concern that motivates our analysis.   
  Well over half of the total herring harvest is sold as bait to American lobster fishermen, 
and in Maine, herring has long remained the preferred bait by lobstermen.  The majority of 
herring processed as bait is channeled through a handful of large wholesalers who then sell to 
smaller dealers and lobster wharfs [NEFMC 2006].
 v  The four largest wholesalers market 56% 
of the herring harvest (table 2).
vi  Bait wholesalers have vertically integrated their operations in a 
number of ways, including producing their own ice, generating their own power, owning trucks 
and performing maintenance and repairs onsite.  Within the largest wholesaler operations, very 
few components of bait processing are outsourced [NEFMC 2005].  With such a concentrated 
and vertically integrated bait industry, the potential for wholesalers to exercise market power in 
the buying of raw herring and the selling of finished bait may potentially alter the predicted 
benefits of ITQ management.  
     [Insert  Table  2  here] 
Although only aggregate data were available, average industry input and output prices suggest 
imperfect competition at the processor’s level.  Based on NEFMC reports, in 2003 the average 
price paid for raw herring was $.08 per pound, the lowest price being $.05 per pound for the 
month of July and the highest being $.16 per pound for the month of October [NEFMC 2004].  
The average price per pound of barreled bait in the same period (accounting for the weight in 
salt) is calculated at $.27 per pound [NEFMC 2005].  It is reasonable to believe the processing 
costs associated with rinsing, salting, barreling and shipping would likely not explain the 330% 
markup.                  
  7  Additionally, there is evidence of barriers preventing additional bait processors from 
entering the industry.  First, as with many fisheries, Atlantic herring fishermen have long-lasting, 
close-knit relationships with their buyers [Acheson 1981; 1985].  Many vessels sell their entire 
annual harvests exclusively to a single dealer.  This relationship instigated the development of 
the ‘days-out’ agreement specified in the ASMFC’s management plan.  The days-out regulation 
limits the number of days fishing to five per week.  The regulation was first implemented and 
enforced cooperatively by both fishermen and buyers to extend the fishing season to insure 
stability of both the lobster and herring fishery.  Over time the regulation has been codified into 
the states’ management plan but is still monitored and enforced informally by both sectors of the 
industry.  This strong long-term relationship can prevent outsiders from seamlessly entering and 
establishing clientele in the bait processing sector. An additional hindrance to entry is the 
physical constraint of having only a limited number of fishing ports and associated space to build 
a processing plant.  From 2000 to 2004, an average of 56% of total herring harvests have been 
landed at the same three ports [NEFMC 2006].  These barriers, along with the evidence of a 
concentrated processing sector earning significant price markups, are suggestive of the existence 
of imperfect competition among bait dealers.      
  In the next section we present a model of a fishery consisting of bait buyers, bait 
processors and fishermen selling fish to be processed as bait.  The model will then be used in 
section 4 to examine the welfare effects of implementing an ITQ system when bait processors 




  83.  The model 
Consider a fishing industry comprised of three distinct sectors: herring fishermen, bait processors 
who act as middlemen in the purchase of raw herring and sale of herring bait, and lobstermen 
who are the final bait consumers.  The single existing regulation in the fishery is a cap on 
aggregate harvest.  
 There  are  F  heterogeneous fishermen (1,2, ...,  ) j F = in the industry each harvesting a 
homogeneous fish product.  Fishermen are assumed to behave perfectly competitively taking 
input prices and output prices as given.  Fishermen choose their level of fishing effort to 
maximize 
  () () () ,, jj j j f be W c e π =  ,                         [1]  
where j π  is individual profit,   is the harvesting production function determining the 
quantity of raw fish supplied to the bait dealers as a function of effort,   is individual effort 
level (e.g., days fishing), W  is the unit price paid to fishermen for their harvest, and   is the 
variable cost of fishing as a function of an individual’s effort.  We assume concavity of the 
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, and ce .  Solving the first-order condition for the optimal level of 
effort and substituting this term into the harvesting production function yields a 
representative fisherman’s supply curve, 
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  The market supply schedule for raw fish (denoted byB ) is a simple aggregation of the 
individual supply functions of the fishermen 
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subject to the constraint that market supply can not surpass the total allowable catch 
() B WT A C ≤ . 
  On the other side of the market, perfectly competitive lobster fishermen ( ) 
purchase bait as an input into their production of lobster.  Each is assumed to maximize 
L 1,2,..., lL =
  () ( ,, ll l ) f kq P R π = ,                        [3] 
where l π  is individual profit,  is the quantity of lobster sold as a function of the quantity of 
bait purchased as an input, is the unit price of bait and
() ll kq
P R is the output price of lobster.  Cost 
elements other than the price of bait have been excluded from the profit function without loss of 
generality.  Solving the first-order condition for the optimal quantity of bait yields an individual 
lobsterman’s demand function for bait, which, when aggregated, forms the market demand 
function 
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The middlemen sector consists of M processors ( 1,2,..., mM = ) transforming a single input – 
raw herring ( ) – into a homogeneous output – herring bait (q). b
vii  The production function for 
bait output is characterized by fixed proportions between the raw input and the final output, i.e., 
m q m b α = .  More specifically, we assume that raw herring is transformed into bait in a one-to-one 
relationship, i.e., 1 α = .  This assumption is reasonable considering that the process of 
transforming raw fish to bait does not produce significant quantities of wasted harvest.  The 
profit function of a representative bait processor   is expressed as   m
  10  () () () ( ) , mm m PQPR q WBb Cq π =− − m ,                 [5] 
whereC is the processing cost of bait and  and  are the quantities of bait sold and raw 
herring purchased, respectively.  With fixed proportions, equation [5] shows that the cost 
function of the processor is separable into input costs and processing costs.  Assuming further 
that there are constant returns to scale in processing, then C(q
m q m b
m)=cqm, where c is the marginal 
processing cost and is a function of the price of processing inputs.   Thus, the first-order 
condition of the profit-maximization problem is 
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.                                   [6] 
This expression states that profit is maximized at the quantity where the representative processor 
equates the marginal revenue from selling an additional unit of output, less the marginal 
processing cost, to the marginal outlay from purchasing an additional unit of input.  The 
expression can be re-written as 
  () () 1
m PQ c WB 1
m θ λ
ε η





,                                                                             [7] 
where  is the market price elasticity of demand for bait and  () ( // QPP Q ε =∂ ∂
() ( / B WWB η =∂ ∂  is the market price elasticity of supply for raw herring.  The terms 
 and  () ( // mm m Qq qQ θ =∂ ∂ ) () ( ) // mm m B bb B λ =∂ ∂  are the processors’ conjectural variations in 
elasticity form for the final product and the raw input respectively.     
  Because we assume bait processors produce homogeneous products and have identical 
production technologies, optimization requires that each firm’s conjectural variation be identical, 
i.e., 12 12 ...  and  ... θ θθ λ λ == = == = λ .  Therefore, the industry equilibrium condition is: 
  11  () () 11 PQ c WB
θ λ
ε η
⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ +− = + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠
 ,                   [8]  
which in conjunction with the market supply equation [2] and the market demand equation [4] 
yields equilibrium values for , W and  P QB = for any given set of parameters.  
 
4.  Welfare analysis 
In this section we compare predicted changes in fishermen’s surplus when transitioning from 
open-access to individual property rights management.  By allowing for varying degrees of 
processors’ imperfectly competitive behavior, we compare how ITQ management affects 
fishermen’s welfare.  The one regulation in common between the open-access and ITQ 
management is the existence of an exogenously determined TAC.  Under ITQs fishermen are 
guaranteed a portion of the established TAC through their quotas.  Fishermen will buy or sell 
quota until each equates its marginal benefit from fishing to the market price for the ITQ 
[National Research Council 1999; Grafton, Kirkley, Squires and Weninger 2000; Grafton, 
Squires and Fox 2000; Weninger 2002]. Thus, in contrast to the overinvestment in capital, 
production inefficiencies, and overcrowding externalities resulting from open-access 
management, the long-run equilibrium under ITQs satisfies the condition for an efficient 
allocation of the resource [Matulich, Mittelhammer and Reberte 1996].  Furthermore, the 
literature on ITQs predicts a reduction in capital and marginal fishing costs as the less efficient 
vessels exit the fishery [Weninger 2002; Squires 2003].  We use these results from the literature 
to simulate the market effects of ITQ management; therefore, the welfare analysis pertains to 
harvesters active in the long run and does not consider welfare changes during the transition to 
ITQs.   
  12  The ITQ-induced reduction in marginal fishing cost is captured in our model by an 
outward pivot (decrease in slope) of the market supply curve for raw fish, and is consistent with 
similar supply analyses by Dryburgh and Doyle (1995) and Alston, Sexton and Zhang (1997).  
To proceed with the welfare analysis, we characterize the fishery following the expressions for 
market supply and demand introduced by Huang and Sexton (1996) and Homans and Wilen 
(2005).  Specifically, we denote  
  B W




− = ,                      [ 4 a ]  
as the market supply [2] and market demand [4] for herring, respectively.  In these 
expressions,B is the quantity of raw fish supplied,β  is a positive parameter, W  is the input price 
of raw fish, Qis the quantity of bait demanded, δ is a positive parameter,  is the output price of 
bait and 
P
 and  η ε are the price elasticities of supply and demand, respectively.  These general 
functional forms satisfy the established property that welfare changes depend most critically on 
the price elasticities of supply and demand (Alston, Sexton and Zhang 1997).   
  We consider three situations that likely reflect the varying circumstances in each of the 
four management areas in the herring fishery: (1) the TAC is nonbinding under open-access and 
remains nonbinding with ITQs (e.g., area 2 and area 3), (2) the TAC is binding under open-access 
and remains binding with ITQs (e.g., area 1A), and (3) the TAC is nonbinding under open-access 
but becomes binding once ITQs are introduced (e.g., area 1B).  The implicit assumption when 
categorizing areas according to the TAC is that fishermen do not move between areas.  This 
feature is consistent with the ITQ system proposed by herring management which allocates 
quotas tied to specific fishing areas.  Trade between management areas must be restricted because 
  13each area has different characteristics (e.g., stock assessments, number of participants and pre-
existing gear and effort restrictions) that require different management strategies.     
  
4.1 Nonbinding TAC 
In this section we assume fishermen are consistently harvesting under their area’s TAC and 
harvest is free to increase or decrease according to the specific management policy (open-access 
or ITQs).  This initial scenario corresponds to the conditions in the off-shore fishing areas 2 and 3 
in which annual harvest remains significantly below their respective quotas. 
 
4.1.1 Perfect competition 
The baseline case to consider is that of open-access management under a perfectly competitive 
processing sector. Equilibrium quantities are therefore determined by substituting [2a], [4a] 
and , 0 θ λ = into [8] and solving for  oa oa QB =  where the subscriptoaindicates quantities under 
open-access management. This equilibrium is illustrated in figure 2.
viii  In this and other figures, 
it is the herring market that is depicted, thus the demand is the derived demand of the processor 
for herring. To depict the market at the bait level, both supply and derived demand would shift up 
by the constant marginal processing cost, c. The equilibrium prices of herring and bait (net of the 
marginal processing cost) are found at the intersection of the derived demand and supply curves, 
i.e., .    () , ( ), and P oa oa oa oa oa oa PP QWW B W == =
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Our analysis is focused exclusively on producer (fishermen) surplus and therefore we do not 
compute changes in consumer’s (lobstermen’s) welfare.
ix  Producer surplus under open-access 
management is represented by area  in figure 2 and is expressed as  oa oa AB W
  14  () ( )
()
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+ ∫ .                  [9] 
Recall, we capture the reduction in marginal fishing cost due to ITQ management as an outward 
pivot in supply.  The new market supply function under ITQ management is  
  () B Wz
η
β = ,                                                                                                                    [2b] 
where is a positive parameter greater than 1. z
x  Solving for W yields the new inverse supply 
function  () ( )
1/ ˆ 1/ / Wz B
η
β = .  Because the TAC is not binding, meaning prices and quantities are 
free to change, the equilibrium net prices and quantities are determined by substituting [2b], [4a] 
and , 0 θ λ = into [8] and solving for  ITQ ITQ QB =  where the subscript ITQindicates ITQ 
management under perfect competition.  The equilibrium prices of herring and bait (net of 
marginal processing cost) are found at the intersection of the derived demand and supply curve, 
i.e.,  , and  () ITQ ITQ PP Q = ( ITQ ITQ WW B = ) ITQ ITQ PW = (figure 2).  Producer surplus in this case is 
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The gain in producer surplus caused by an outward pivot in the market supply curve is the area 
 while the corresponding loss in surplus is the area  . The change in producer 
surplus due to the introduction of property rights management, is expressed formally as   
1 ABC 0 ITQ oa WC B W
  15 
(1 )





∆= − = − ⎜ ⎜
⎝⎠
⎟ ⎟                  [11] 
Given that z > 1, the change in producer surplus under perfect competition will be strictly greater 
than zero if demand for bait is elastic( ) 1. ε >   Thus, under an elastic demand for bait, there is an 
increase in welfare for fishermen from a transition from open-access to ITQ management.  In this 
case, the gain in producer surplus from an increase in quantity sold will more than offset the 
simultaneous loss in surplus from the lower price.  However, if the demand for bait is 
inelastic( , the change in surplus will be strictly less than zero, which translates to a 
decrease in welfare from the change in management.  Finally, if the price elasticity of demand is 
exactly one, there will be no change in surplus from the adoption of ITQs.  This result is 
consistent with previous studies which show that if demand is inelastic and markets are 
competitive, producers will necessarily lose from a proportional supply shift [Alston, Sexton and 
Zhang 1997].   
) 1 ε <
 
4.1.2 Imperfect competition 
We now relax the assumption of a perfectly competitive processing sector and allow the 
conjectural variation parameters to take on positive values, i.e., , (0,1). θ λ∈  The herring 
harvesters and the lobstermen as final bait consumers are assumed to remain perfectly 
competitive.  Equilibrium prices and quantities are now determined by substituting [2a], [4a] into 
[8] and solving for   where the subscript indicates open-access prices and quantities 
in the presence of an imperfectly competitive processing sector.  The equilibrium prices for 
herring and bait (net of marginal processing cost) are found on the respective supply and derived 
demand curves at the equilibrium quantity, i.e., 
ioa ioa QB = ioa
( ) ioa ioa PP Q =  and   (figure 3).  ( ioa ioa WW B = )
  16[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Producer surplus in this case is represented by area  in figure 3 and is expressed as  0 ioa AB W
  ( ) ()
()
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We proceed, as before, by assuming the long-run impact of ITQ management is captured by an 
outward pivot of the market supply curve.  With a pivot in supply, the equilibrium prices and 
quantity are found by substituting [2b], [4a] into [8] and solving for  iITQ iITQ QB = (figure 3), where 
the subscript  denotes ITQ management under imperfect competition.  The equilibrium net 
price for raw herring and bait are found on the respective supply and derived demand curves at 
the equilibrium quantity, i.e., 
iITQ
( ) iITQ iITQ PP Q = and ( ) ˆ
iITQ iITQ WW B = .  Producer surplus in this case 
is represented by area  in figure 3 and is expressed as  1 iITQ ABW
    
() ( ) ()
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In figure 3, the gain and loss in producer surplus from an ITQ-driven outward pivot in market 
supply is illustrated by areas  and , respectively.  The change in fishermen’s 
surplus corresponds to      
1 ACB 0 ioa iITQ WB C W
(1 )
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⎝⎠
⎟ ⎟ .                 [14] 
The expression above (the subscript i indicates imperfect competition) indicates that producers 
will lose from ITQ management if demand is inelastic ( 0 PS ∆ < ), but gain if demand is elastic 
  17( ). Moreover, the magnitude of the gain or loss in producer surplus following the 
implementation of ITQs depends on the size of the pivotal shift and the elasticity of demand and 
supply. Contrary to the perfectly competitive scenario, PS
0 PS ∆>
ioa depends on the level of market 
power of the processors in both the purchase of herring and sale of bait, i.e., it depends on λ and 
θ.  More specifically, the size of the gain/loss in producer surplus from ITQs decreases with the 
increase in the level of market power of processors.   
  In summary, regardless of processor behavior, when the TAC is nonbinding, herring 
fishermen necessarily gain from ITQs if the demand for bait is elastic (table 3). However, if 
processors have market power in herring purchase and/or bait sale, the magnitude of the gains 
from ITQs will decrease with an increase in market power. 
 
4.2 Binding TAC 
In the previous section we assumed fishermen were consistently harvesting less than their area’s 
TAC. To address the circumstances within the inshore fishing area 1A in which the TAC is 
consistently exhausted, we now assume the TAC will be binding under both management 
options. 
 
4.2.1 Perfect competition 
The TAC is assumed to be set somewhere between zero and the equilibrium quantity that would 
be realized in the absence of a quantity restriction, i.e., [0, ] TAC oa B B ∈ .  Under the binding quota 
assumption, along with , 0 θ λ = , the equilibrium prices are determined by substituting  into 
[2a] and [4a].  In other words, the price of herring is determined at the intersection of derived 
demand and supply where the supply becomes vertical at the TAC level (figure 4). 
TAC B
  18     [Insert  Figure  4  here] 
The corresponding producer surplus is represented by area in figure 4 and is expressed as  0 TAC AB P
  () ()
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=− = − ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ∫ .           [15] 
With the imposition of ITQs we expect, as before, an outward pivot in the market supply curve 
captured by [2b].  However, now the aggregate harvest level is fixed at TAC B .  Thus, fishermen 
sell the same quantity of herring for the same net price , but producer surplus has increased 
due to the increase in efficiency associated with ITQs.  Producer surplus under ITQ management 
is represented by area and is expressed as 
TAC W
10TAC AB B W
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=− =− ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ∫ .           [16] 
In figure 4, area represents the gain in producer surplus from an ITQ-driven outward pivot 














+ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ∆= − = − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
.                          [17] 
Recall that , and therefore the change in producer surplus must be positive.  Thus fishermen 
will strictly gain from the imposition of ITQs when the industry is perfectly competitive and the 
TAC is binding.     
1 z >
 
4.2.2 Imperfect competition 
The binding level of harvest when allowing for imperfect competition among processors is 
similarly expressed as , i.e., the TAC is set somewhere between zero and the  [0, ] iTAC ioa BB ∈
  19unregulated equilibrium.  As before, the equilibrium output price for herring is determined where 
the fixed supply, , intersects the derived demand curve for bait, i.e., .  As Sexton 
and Zhang (1996) point out, with an inelastic supply curve, the traditional industrial organization 
models to determine equilibrium prices under imperfect competition are not valid. Following 
Sexton and Zhang, with a binding quota on harvest, the division of fixed surplus between the 
processors and herring fishermen is essentially a bargaining problem.  For our welfare analysis, 
the price paid to fishermen for raw bait is set somewhere between the perfectly competitive 
price, , and the price realized under a monopsonist processor,    The exact 
input price is assumed to be a decreasing function of the level of market power of the processors 
in purchase of herring, i.e., a function of oligopsony power as measured by
iTAC B ( iTAC PB )
) ) ( iTAC PB ( . iTAC WB
(0,1) λ∈ .  The 
rational is that when there are more firms (i.e., less market power and a smaller λ ), firms will 
bid against one another, increasing the price of the input.  As market power decreases, through 
an increase in the number of buyers of raw herring for example, the price paid to fishermen 
moves closer to the price under perfect competition.   
 Using  λ  as our proxy for the level of processor bargaining power in setting the price of 
raw herring, the open-access equilibrium net input price is  ( ) ( ) (1 ) iTAC iTAC iTAC WW B P B λλ =+ −.  
The price of herring   is therefore a weighted average of the price realized under perfect 
competition (
iTAC W
0 λ = ) and the price that would exist under a single bait processor or a perfectly 
collusive group of processors ( 1 λ = ).    
    The price of the bait output (net of marginal processing cost) is found on the derived 
demand curve at the quota quantity, i.e., the price of the output is  ( ) iTAC PB . Figure 5 illustrates 
  20the equilibrium for the special case where 1 λ = .  The producer surplus is represented by area 
ADWiTAC and is expressed generally as 




ioa iTAC iTAC iTAC PS W B P B B W B dB λλ ⎡⎤ =+ − − ⎣⎦ ∫
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
An outward pivot in the supply curve, in the absence of a quantity restraint, would motivate the 
imperfectly competitive processing sector to demand an increase in the amount of herring it 
purchases and sells on the market (figure 5).  However, because the TAC is assumed binding, the 
rotation in the supply curve caused by the implementation of ITQs simply decreases the price 
processors with market power have to pay fishermen for the same quantity of herring and thus 
increases the processors' markup. Under these conditions, the new producer surplus is 
represented by area ABWiITQ in figure 5 and is expressed generally as 
  ,                     [19]  () () ( )
0
ˆ (1 )  
iTAC B
iITQ iTAC iTAC iTAC PS W B P B B W B dB λλ ⎡⎤ =+ − − ⎣⎦ ∫
ˆ

















+ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ∆= − = − − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
.                         [20] 
Because() 1 10 z −<, equation [20] indicates that fishermen will strictly lose under ITQs if 
/( 1) λ ηη >+  and will strictly gain when /( 1) λ ηη < + .  The change in welfare when 1 λ = is 
illustrated as area  minus area W ACB iITQCDWiTAC in figure 5.   
  Therefore, when the TAC is binding under open-access management, fishermen are 
expected to gain from ITQ management if processors are perfectly competitive and lose if 
processors act as a perfectly collusive monopsony ( 1 λ = ). When processors are oligopsonists 
  21([ 0 , 1 ] λ∈ ), the more inelastic is the supply function of herring and the greater the level of market 
power, the more likely fishermen will lose from the implementation of ITQs.  The size of the 
welfare loss is expected to decrease monotonically with reductions in the level of processor 
market power, eventually turning to zero once /( 1) λ ηη = + .   
  Assuming that processors behave as Cournot rivals, the conjectural variation 
parameterλ can be defined as1/ , M where M is the number of identical processors.  Therefore, 
for fishermen to lose from ITQ management, 1/ /( 1) M η η >+ must be satisfied.  Rearranging 
this expression to  indicates that the price elasticity of supply must be less 
than for fishermen to lose from ITQ management.  For example, with four processors 
(i.e.,  M = 4), 
( 1/ 1 M η <− )
) ( 1/ 1 M −
η  must be lower than 1/3 for fishermen to suffer a loss.  In   
short, under a rather inelastic supply and a nontrivial level of market   
power, ITQs are welfare reducing for herring harvesters.     
  In summary, when the TAC is binding, herring fishermen’s welfare improves with the 
implementation of ITQ if processors are perfectly competitive. However, if processors have 
market power in the purchase of herring, fishermen could lose from ITQ if market power is 
significant and/or the elasticity of supply of herring is sufficiently small.  These results are 
summarized in table 3. 
 
4.3 Initially nonbinding, and then binding TAC 
In this third and final scenario the TAC is initially assumed not to bind under open-access 
management but later becomes binding once the ITQ-induced outward pivot in supply occurs.  
This set of circumstances best reflects fishing effort within the inshore area 1B where harvest 
levels have fluctuated above and below the TAC between 2000 and 2004.  Additionally, this 
  22scenario reflects what stakeholders predict would happen within the off-shore areas if future 
demand for lobster bait increases. 
 
4.3.1 Perfect competition 
If all sectors of the fishing industry behave perfectly competitively, the change in fishermen’s 
surplus can be determined by comparing producer surplus under ITQ management with a 
binding quota [16] and producer surplus under open-access management when the quota is 
initially nonbinding [9]. Our results for this scenario are summarized in the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: With a perfectly competitive fishing industry and a TAC that becomes binding 
after the imposition of ITQs, an elastic demand ( 1 ε > ) is a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition for an improvement in fishermen’s welfare.   
Proof: see appendix A.1 
 
If demand is elastic fishermen will necessarily gain surplus from individual property rights 
management.  On the other hand, if demand is inelastic, fishermen may gain or lose surplus 
depending on the interaction of the remaining market parameters.  The relationship between the 
directional change in fishermen’s welfare and the remaining market parameters when demand is 
inelastic( is described in the following Lemma. 
( 1 ε > )
) 1 ε <
 
  23Lemma 1: With a perfectly competitive fishing industry and a TAC that becomes binding after 
the imposition of ITQs, if demand is inelastic( ) 1 ε < there is an increase (decrease) in 
fishermen’s welfare when the efficiency gains from ITQ are sufficiently large (small). 
Lemma 1 is demonstrated in appendix A.2 
 
If demand is inelastic, fishermen will be increasingly better off as the cost of harvesting declines 
– the change in producer surplus eventually turning positive for large enough gain in efficiency. 
Therefore, when demand is inelastic, large decreases in harvesting costs eventually more than 
offset the decrease in price associated with the increase in quantity to meet the TAC. 
 
4.3.2 Imperfect competition 
With an imperfectly competitive processing sector, the change in fishermen’s welfare is 
determined by comparing producer surplus with ITQs under a binding quota [19] and the open-
access level of producer surplus with a nonbinding quota [12]. Our results for this scenario are 
summarized in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2: When the processing sector is imperfectly competitive and the TAC becomes 
binding after ITQ management,  ( ) /1 ληη <+ is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for an 
improvement in fishermen’s welfare.  
Proof: see appendix A.3 
 
Proposition 2 indicates that fishermen can expect to gain from ITQ management if the processing 
sector has a limited amount of market power in the purchase of raw herring. Recall 
  24that  is the condition required for fishermen to benefit from ITQs when the TAC is 
assumed to be initially binding (see equation [20]).  Intuitively, this condition illustrates that if 
processors have limited bargaining power in setting the price paid to fishermen for raw fish (i.e., 
low
( / ληη <+ ) 1
λ ), fishermen will gain from the decreased harvesting costs realized through ITQ 
management.  
  In circumstances in which ( ) / ληη >+ 1
) 1
, determining whether fishermen gain or lose 
from ITQs depends on the size of the efficiency gains from ITQ management.  This relationship 
is described in our second lemma. 
 
Lemma 2: When the processing sector is imperfectly competitive and the TAC becomes binding 
after ITQ management, if , fishermen suffer an increase (decrease) in welfare when 
z is sufficiently small (large).   
( / ληη >+
Demonstrated in appendix A.4 
  
The intuition behind lemma 2 is that if processors have a significant level of market power when 
setting the input price, fishermen will be increasingly worse off as the cost of harvesting 
declines.  That is, processors can exploit the low cost of fishing by offering a lower input price.  
The results from this section are summarized in table 3.    
  
5. Discussion and policy implications 
Individual property rights management is often proposed as the ‘silver bullet’ to solving fisheries 
management problems.  The literature on ITQs suggests two reasons for efficiency gains.  First, 
fishermen with relatively high fishing costs will opt to sell their quotas and exit the fishery while 
  25the remaining participants, in turn, are able to fish the entire TAC at a lower variable cost.  
Second, because fishermen are guaranteed a fixed portion of the TAC, they no longer have an 
incentive to race to catch as many fish as quickly as possible allowing each to fish at their own 
profit-maximizing level of effort.  In addition to these efficiency gains, a number of stylized 
models of ITQ management predict that fishermen, as a whole, will witness an increase in 
welfare resulting from the management change [Terrebonne 1995].  However, these efficiency 
and welfare gains have been derived relying on the assumption of a perfectly competitive 
industry.  In many fisheries, and in particular the Atlantic herring fishery, certain sectors of the 
industry show evidence of imperfectly competitive behavior.  Therefore an important question 
remains concerning the impact of middlemen’s market power on fishermen’s welfare.   
  This paper specifically addressed how fishermen’s welfare changes in the long run after 
transitioning from open access to ITQ management in the presence of an imperfectly competitive 
processing sector.  Currently, the level of data available pertaining to the herring fishery does not 
allow for direct estimation of the degree of processor market power. Atlantic herring 
management, at this point, only records individual level data on harvest quantities and effort 
levels (e.g., days fishing, vessel size and number of crew members) for the purposes of managing 
the TAC.  They do not record data on the input and output prices needed for economic analysis. 
In light of this, we presented a series of empirical observations suggesting the presence and 
importance of market power at the processing level.   
  In the herring fishery, effort is unevenly dispersed across four management areas. We 
considered three scenarios that reflected each of these circumstances: a binding TAC, a 
nonbinding TAC and a change from nonbinding to binding TAC. Our results show that 
fishermen may gain or lose welfare depending on the area they fish in, the interaction of the price 
  26elasticities of supply and demand, and the size of the efficiency gains. In the larger, off-shore 
fishing areas (areas 2 and 3), where the TAC is not binding, fishermen’s welfare is expected to 
increase, independent of the assumption on processor competitiveness, provided that the demand 
for bait is elastic.  There is enough evidence that although herring are preferred, lobster 
fishermen have available substitutes for herring as lobster bait (e.g. skate, redfish/flatfish, 
cunner, menhaden and artificial soy-based products) and therefore the assumption of an elastic 
demand curve seems reasonable.  The implication is that the collection of fishermen in the off-
shore areas is expected to gain from ITQ management.  
  Within the popular inshore area 1A (where the TAC is already binding), our results 
indicate fishermen can expect to gain if processors are sufficiently competitive but will 
necessarily lose if processors exhibit strong degrees of market power in the purchase of raw 
herring.  The magnitude of the loss is directly related to the degree of market power and the size 
of the efficiency gain, and inversely related to the elasticity of supply. Because the majority of 
participants currently fish in this area, the possibility of a welfare loss should be factored in as a 
potential cost to ITQ management.   
Finally, in the inshore area 1B within which harvest levels are expected to reach the TAC 
once ITQs are implemented, we expect fishermen to gain if processors behave competitively and 
demand is elastic.  On the other hand, if processors hold a significant level of market power 
and/or the efficiency gains from ITQs are relatively low, fishermen in this area are expected to 
suffer losses from the change in management.       
          
 
 
  276. Conclusion  
While much of the economic literature on ITQs focuses on gains in the aggregate, the 
fundamental policy debate revolves around the distribution of these gains among industry 
participants. In this paper we use a general model of imperfect competition to predict changes in 
fishermen’s welfare within an open-access fishery after it transitions to individual transferable 
quota (ITQ) management.  Although the circumstances in the Atlantic herring fishery motivated 
this analysis, its implications are relevant to all fisheries with similar market characteristics. 
Contrary to the presumption that efficiency gains benefit all fishermen, our results show that 
even under perfect competition, whether fishermen benefit from ITQ depends not only on the 
elasticity of demand and supply, but also on the magnitude of the efficiency gains and on 
whether the cap on total harvest is binding.  In addition, when market power is present, the size 
of producer welfare gains from ITQs are inversely related to the level of processor market power. 
Implementing ITQs can even result in a loss in fishermen’s welfare under significant levels of 
market power and, in the case where the TAC becomes binding, under large efficiency gains 
from ITQs.  The overarching implication of this analysis is that fishermen may not witness the 
predicted welfare gains from ITQ management when processors are capable of capturing some 
or all of the policy-induced gains in efficiency. 
There are four critical implications for renewable resource management that stem from 
this research.  First, evaluations of ITQs need to incorporate the processing sector and explicitly 
consider market imperfections. Second, if achieving welfare gains for fishermen is a fundamental 
management objective, relying on a policy of individual property rights is unlikely to generate 
the desired outcome under the presence of powerful market intermediaries. Third, changes in 
efficiency of production are not a sufficient measure of gains from ITQs.  Last, data needed to 
  28estimate market power are consistently unavailable for fisheries; however, the critical role of 
market power on the welfare impacts of ITQs suggests that regulatory agencies should invest in 
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  32Appendix 
 
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1: With a perfectly competitive fishing industry and a TAC that 
becomes binding after the imposition of ITQs, an elastic demand ( 1 ε > ) is a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition for an improvement in fishermen’s welfare. 
  
The proof is organized as follows. We first recall and derive useful relationships. Then we derive 




  (i)        1 z >
  (ii)    , 
unbounded
TAC ITQ BB <
 
where the superscript unbounded indicates the equilibrium level of harvest under ITQ 
management when the TAC does not bind.  Condition (ii) indicates that under scenario 4.3 the 
TAC is binding.  In the absence of a quota, the unbounded level of harvest is determined where 




δ ), i.e.,  
  (iii) 
unbounded
ITQ oa B zB
εη
εη + = . 
 
Substituting this expression into (ii) and manipulating the inequality, we form the following 
useful relationship: 
 














.                                [A1] 
 
Next, consider the expression for producer surplus under perfect competition and open-
access management when the TAC is nonbinding (equation [9]) 
 
  ,  
0 ()
oa B
oa oa oa PS W B W B dB =− ∫
 
and the expression for producer surplus under perfect competition and ITQ management when 
the TAC is binding (equation [16]) 
 




ITQ TAC TAC PS W B W B dB =− ∫
 
When the processing sector is perfectly competitive, WP = , and therefore we can re-write these 
expressions by substituting    in for    and   for  .  When substituting the expressions 
for the market supply and market demand, [4a] and [4b], in the two producer surplus equations 
above, we get 
TAC P TAC W oa P oa W
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We divide the proof of the proposition into two parts. In the first part, we show that if the 
demand is elastic, then the change in producer surplus is positive. In the second part, we show 
that the change in producer surplus can be positive or negative when the demand is inelastic. 
 
1)  If the demand is elastic, then the change in producer surplus is positive. 
 
When the demand is elastic, the first component of expression [A2],Ω, is positive because, by 
definition, . TAC oa B B >   Further, the first component within the larger brackets,χ , is always 
greater than one because total revenue ( ) will always exceed the area under the supply 
curve at the quantity
oa oa PB
oa B   .  Moreover, when ( ) 0 ()
oa B
WBd B ∫ 1 ε ≥ , the denominator of the second 
component in the larger brackets, , is positive and less than one.  What remain to be evaluated 
are the sign of the numerator and the magnitude of the ratio
ϒ
ϒ .   
 
  The sign of the numerator of ϒ  can be either positive or negative depending on the 























, which are both smaller than one by [A1] and 
by definition, respectively. In both cases (positive or negative numerator) we can show that 
 If the numerator is negative,  0. PS ∆> ϒ <0, then the change in producer surplus is positive. If 
the numerator is positive, the ratio ϒ  is positive and we can also determine that it is less than 
  34one using [A1] to compare the relative magnitude of the numerator and denominator.  Thus, χ -
>0 and the change in producer surplus is positive.  ϒ
  
Therefore, we conclude that if  1 ε > , then  0. PS ∆ >           
 
2)  The change in producer surplus can be positive or negative when the demand is inelastic. 
 
When the demand is inelastic, the expression Ω in [A2] is negative. Further note that the 













  Moreover, from [A1] we know that the 











, is less than 1.  Consequently, the numerator 
of is also negative.  Thus, with inelastic demand, both ϒ χ andϒ are positive and fishermen will 
lose surplus from ITQ management ifχ >ϒ , and will gain surplus if χ <ϒ .                       ■ 
   
 
 
A.2 Demonstration of Lemma 1 
 
When the demand is inelastic, the sign of  PS ∆  is undetermined. Taking the first derivative of 































The marginal effect of z on the change in producer surplus is positive because under an inelastic 
demand both   and the denominator of  Ω ϒ  are negative. This result implies that an increase in 
efficiency gain leads to an increase in PS ∆ . Thus, the implementation of ITQ will result in an 








  35A.3 Proof of Proposition 2: When the processing sector is imperfectly competitive and the TAC 
becomes binding after ITQ management,  ( ) / ληη1 < + is a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition for an improvement in fishermen’s welfare. 
 
Subtract equation [12] from equation [9] and substitute the expressions for   and 
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β = , and rearranging terms, we can rearrange this 
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This expression and the signs of its various elements show the following: 
1) If  /(1 ) λ η <+ η
)
) 1
, then the change in producer surplus from the change in management is 
positive. 
2) If  , then the change in producer surplus is positive (negative) if the sum of 
the two elements inside the curly bracket is positive (negative).                                      ■ 
( /1 ληη >+
 
 
A.4 Demonstration of Lemma 2 
 
When the sign of is undetermined.  Taking the first derivative of   with 
respect to z yields 
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indicating that the change in producer surplus from ITQ management is decreasing with larger 
efficiency gains.      





Table 1. Percentage of TAC mt by management area for 2000 – 2004 (vessel trip reports) 
               
Year  Area 1A  Area 1B  Area 2  Area 3  Total (mt) 
TAC = 60,000 mt  TAC = 10,000 mt  TAC = 50,000 mt  TAC = 60,000 mt*  180,000 mt   
% of TAC  % of TAC  % of TAC  % of TAC   
2000  101% 75% 54% 26%  108,658 
2001  89% 167% 32% 70%  121,332 
2002  100% 73% 22% 28%  92,594 
2003  100% 50% 33% 36%  103,187 
2004  100% 136% 23%  15%  94,152 
* The TAC in Area 3 was increased from 50,000 mt to 60,000 mt in 2003 




































Table 2. Volume and percentage of herring sold to bait dealers for the largest four bait dealers in 
2003 
 
Volume of Largest 4 
Bait Dealers 
Cumulative Percentage of 
Total Bait Harvest 
11,793 mt  20% 
8,332 mt  34% 
7,451 mt  47% 
5,443 mt  56% 






















































   ε >1 ε  < 1 ε   >1  ε < 1 
 
4.1 Nonbinding TAC  
(Open-Access and ITQs) 
 










4.2 Binding TAC  
(Open-Access and ITQs) 
 





(+) if /( 1) λ ηη <+
  
  (−) if  /( 1) λ ηη >+  
 
4.3 Nonbinding TAC with  
Open-Access/ 






+ (−) if z is 
sufficiently 
large (small) 
(+) if /( 1) λ ηη <+  
(+) if /( 1) λ ηη >+  and z is 
sufficiently small 
(−) if /( 1) λ ηη >+  and z is 
sufficiently large 
Note: “+”(“-”) indicates a gain (loss) in welfare, e and h denote the elasticity of demand and supply respectively, 
and l denotes the conjectural variation elasticity of processors in the purchase of herring. 
  39Figure 1. Management areas in the Atlantic herring fishery 
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Figure 2.  Changes in producer surplus from ITQ management under perfect competition 
with a nonbinding TAC  
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Figure 3.   Changes in producer surplus when transitioning from open-access to ITQ 
management under imperfect competition with a nonbinding TAC 
 
Note: 
() () ( )() [] 1 MR P BB PB PB λλ ′ =+ + −  
[( ) ( ) ] ( 1 ) ( ) MOW B B W B W B θ θ ′ =+ + −  














Figure 4.  Changes in producer surplus when transitioning from open-access to ITQ 
management under perfect competition with a binding TAC 
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Figure 5.  Changes in producer surplus when transitioning from open-access to ITQ 


























                                                 
()( )() ()( )() 11
i Formally, the fishery is managed in state waters by the ASMFC and in federal waters by the NEFMC.  Both 
management bodies have developed separate but largely consistent management plans.  A critical difference 
between the two is the additional “days out” provision in the ASMFC’s Interstate FMP.        
ii The individual quota regulation proposed within Amendment 1 is defined as an individual fishing quota (IFQ) 
system.  Typically, IFQs describe a quota regime in which quotas may not be traded among participants.  However, 
the IFQs proposed by Atlantic herring management allow for trading and therefore, in this paper, we describe the 
regulation as an ITQ system.   
iii For a complete assessment, see North East Fisheries Science Center (2003). 
iv Brandt and McEvoy (2006) find significant levels of excess capacity among Atlantic herring fishermen.   
v The wholesalers process and sell herring as bait in a number of ways.  A portion of herring is sold fresh to lobster 
fishermen who purchase bait directly from the wholesaler.  While fresh herring will only last a few days, salted bait 
can last up to six months.  The salting process includes rinsing, layering herring in salt, barreling and then shipping 
by boat or truck.   
vi The 56% estimate should be considered a conservative lower bound.  Some dealers have bait holdings listed under 
different permit numbers and the available data is not detailed enough to properly match multiple permits to single 
firms. 
vii Recall, raw herring is sold either unaltered as fresh bait or sold salted and barreled.  For this analysis, we assume 
all finished bait is homogeneous and the cost component in the profit function captures all relevant processing costs.     
viii In figure 2, we use linear forms for the general functions in order to clearly illustrate relationships.  Note also that, 
the equilibrium expression in [8] can be alternatively written as MRQ PQ c M CB WB θθ λλ +− − = +−
() () [
 
where ]/ MRQ PQQ Q =∂ ∂ () () [ ]/ MCB WBB B =∂ ∂ is the industry marginal revenue schedule and is the 
industry marginal cost schedule.  Because θ (λ ) takes values between zero (i.e., perfect competition) and one (i.e., 
monopoly), it can be interpreted as a weight measuring the importance of the demand curve (supply curve) relative 
to the marginal revenue (marginal outlay) curve in determining the equilibrium quantity of bait (Melnick and Shalit 
1985).  The alternative expression for equation [8] is useful in the illustration of equilibrium under imperfect 
competition. 
ix It is useful to note that because we model the long-term effect of an ITQ system as an outward pivot in the market 
supply curve, lobstermen will necessarily benefit from the management change in this scenario. 
x It may be reasonable to assume that the reduction in fishing costs, and therefore the magnitude of the pivot in 
supply, will differ according to the characteristics of the four fishing areas.  However, because we are estimating 
changes in welfare within isolated fishing areas there is no need to differentiate supply shifts for the different areas 
in our analysis.    
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